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REPORT
Number 17--April 1974

At->R.Ad~,_..

James J. Lopach, Visiting Assistant Professor,
Department of Political Science,
University of Montana

Introduction
Sources and Expectations
of Utility Regulation
Utility regulation in Montana has perennially occupied
center stage in Montana politics. The Montana Public
Service Commission has been a persistent subject of
heated controversy concerning the quality of protection
it has given the consuming public. This situation has not
been unique, because state regulatory commissions generally have not enjoyed good reputation with students of
public affairs. The Montana Public Service Commission
is characteristic, therefore, in that it has few defenders
and many critics. The common view in Montana- the
opinion of a newspaper editor, a law professor, an attorney, a legislator, a housewife, a former utility employee
- is that the Montana Public Service Commission is in the
"back pocket" of the state's largest utilities. Public attitude toward utility regulation is important when adequacy
of energy sources is being widely debated. The Commission soon will be asked again to make significant decisions
concerning utility rates and practices. How should its
regulatory decisions be received? This article attempts
to provide information that will help answer this question.*
In 1913 the Montana Legislative Assembly created
the Public Service Commission to protect the consumer
by supervising, controlling, and regulating public utilities
in the public interest. This move was a concession by the
legislature that effective regulation demanded detailed
knowledge and continuing attention that the legislature
itself had not been able to provide. The commission was
*The Report is based upon the author's Ph.D. dissertation in Political
Science, The Montana Public Service Commission: A Study in Administrative Decision-Making, University of Notre Dame, 1973.
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thought to have certain strengths that would enable it to
carry out its mandate. It should provide flexibility and
expert knowledge in the state's attempts to maintain a
fair balance between rates and service under constantly
changing circumstances.
For many reasons, in Montana as elsewhere, this regulatory design has been less effective than was expected.
State regulatory commissions were endowed by legislatures with broad discretionary power. Vaguely stated
formal requirements to determine rates in the "public
interest" gave the commissions great potential control
over the activities of utilities. The utilities responded by
increasing their political vigilance and activity. At the
same time, the regulatory commissions were hampered by
a role conflict between administrative functions and
judicial functions lodged in the same body. To the degree
that the administrative or investigative characteristic
came to be deemphasized, the commissions became passive agencies increasingly dependent upon expert and
informed presentations by the regulated company.
Marver Berstein has provided an interesting interpretation of the apparent failure of these regulatory bodies
in the United States. [Bernstein, Regulating Business by
Independent Commission (1955) 74-102.] His cyclical
theory traced evolution of a regulatory body through
consecutive stages of crusading reform, identification
with the goals of a specific industry's management, and
finally institutional senility taking refuge in the status
quo which it had fostered. There were many reasons for
this decline, but Berstein stressed the overwhelming
superiority of the regulated industry in its tecbnical
knowledge and the ignorance of the general public about
regulatory matters. Public ignorance meant indifference
and lack of support for vigorous regulation. Lacking
support for vigorous activity, the regulatory commission
eventually closed ranks with its only defender, the regulated indust~y. to become, in time, the protector of the

RECEIVED Ll11RrY

industry. Thus Bernstein generalized American experience with regulatory commissions.
Commentaries on the status of governmental regulation of business usually refer to the final stage of this
cycle. In 1951 Harold Ickes asked:

Lee Metcalf said the Montana Power Company was
behind a "drive for economic and political domination"
of Montana. [Great Falls Tribune, August 20, 1967.]
In the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, Missoula
delegate George Heliker, a professor of economics,
stated:

[W]ho today believes that the public interest is served by these
State commissions? In the course of time the private utilities
muscled their way in by the usual methods with the result that
the commissions, in effect, became adjuncts . . . of the private
utilities. [Gellhorn and Byse, Administrative Law (4th ed.,
1960) 39.]

[O]ne needs no special expertise in the esoteric realms of that
ritualistic enterprise lau-ghingly referred to as 'regulation' of
public utilities to know that it is one of the great scandals of
American state government in the twentieth century. Anyone
even faintly acquainted with the facts knows that, in all but a
handful of states, the corporations who were to have been
regulated in the consumer's interest have long since become
the regulators-regulating regulatory commissions, regulating
legislatures, regulating courts, regulating opinion, and regulating elections. ["Statement of George B. Heliker to the
Montana Constitutional Convention Public Health, Welfare,
Labor, and Industry Committee, February 5, 1972" (Helena,
1972) 1-2.]

Paul MacAvoy attributes distortion of the intent ofregulatory commissions to the greater expertise of the regulated
industry: "In the end, rates are fixed which reflect no
other reality than that of compromise, reinforced partly
by the superior advantage of the utilities in litigation."
[MacAvoy, The Crisis of the Regulatory Commissions
( 1970) 11.] Grant McConnell echoes the conclusions of
Bernstein: "The outstanding political fact about the independent regulatory commissions is that they have in general become the promoters and protectors of the industries
they have been established to regulate." [McConnell,
Private Power and American Democracy (1966) 287.]
The most severe criticism of attempts at regulation,
however, is not the failure effectively to regulate but the
concern that interest group domination of the regulatory
process has poisoned the entire political system. McConnell has said that comprehensive efforts of a regulated
industry to achieve a favorable regulatory climate result
in "corruption in the political process itself." [Ibid., 32]
Paul Douglas noted a corrupting backlash to state regulation:
With the coming of state regulation of electricity, gas and telephone rates, these private utilities then reached out increasingly
to control the state governments and to regulate their supposed
regulators. Every student and practitioner of politics knows how
these private utilities have been among the most corrupting
forces in state politics during the last 30 years. [Gellhorn and
Byse, Administrative Law (4th ed., 1960) 42.]

Charges of regulatory failure, interest group domination, and impairment of the political system have been
voiced in Montana politics for years. Upon his election to
the Montana Public Service Commission in 1935, Jerry J .
O'Connell said:
Too long have the consumers of Montana paid the cost of
election activities of the power trust here; too long have they
paid the cost of the lobbying activities of these companies seeking every special privilege they can obtain; too long have the
consumers paid for the wine, the women, and the. whisky which
changes legislative minds at every assembly since Montana was
admitted to the Union; too long has the consumer's money been
used to place the burden of taxation upon them and relieve the
profit-mad plunderers of Montana. [The Western Progressive,
January 4, 1935.]

In 1954 Attorney General Arnold Olsen charged the Public Service Commission with refusal to resist utility and
railroad rate increase requests: "It is painfully evident
the consumers of Montana are not going to be protected
by their Railroad and Public Service Commission!'
[Great Falls Tribune, March 15, 1954.] In 1967 Senator

Thus, criticism of the regulatory process in Montana,
as elsewhere, often rests on a perceived invasion of a
public or governmental function by a private, narrowly
defined interest. The organized private interest is depicted as usurper to the degree that it weakens the public
institution's advocacy of the public interest. The fact that
a public interest exists to be defined through substantive
policies cannot easily be dismissed. Imprecision of available criteria admits a wide range of possible resolutions,
and the size of the financial interests involved insures
that conflicting approaches will be articulated.
The writer believes that a public interest can be identified in utility regulation, and that it must balance the
rate-payer's burden and the economic soundness of the
utility-service to the consumer and profit to the investor.
How ever the balance is struck, the definition of the public
interest will always be subject to pressure from all parties
to the bargain for a redefininition more favorable to
their particular interest. Accordingly, private utilities
are not pirates because they are profit oriented. Their
tactics to achieve favorable regulatory policies need not
be regarded as sinister. Because the conditions on which
regulatory decisions are based change, and because all
parties will continually seek adjustments in the existing
regulatory scheme, the public interest can never be immutably identified. Thus, discussion of the public interest
might more profitably focus on the regulatory system's
procedural aspect, on its operating relationships and its
rules, rather than on the outcome of the process. The
public interest has broad and enduring significance when
it is defined in terms of the openness and fairness and
thoroughness of the process that ultimately leads to the
regulatory decision. In concrete terms, this means that
the regulatory process could be functionally open and
not merely formally open; all parties to the hearing
would have equal access to competent professional representation, to complete and reliable information, and
adequate time to prepare arguments. It means that the
commissioners would accompany their decision with a
clear, well-reasoned written opinion. Such formulation
of the public interest could give added meaning to a
discussion of the adequacy of utility regulation in Montana.

The Montana Public Service
Commission:
An Unfulfilled Promise
The task the Montana Public Service Commission was
established to accomplish has never been in doubt. In
1923 the commission clearly expressed its mandates.
Prior to its establishment:
[E]very rate to a consumer of a product of a public utility in
Montana rested on private contract between the consumer and
the utility. Some of these rates were unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, and unduly preferential. To put a stop to practices
of that character, to improve the service rendered by public
utilities, to cause to be fixed just, reasonable, and equitable rates
for the service rendered, and to equalize the burden between
consumers, manifestly were objects within the legislative intention. [State ex rel Rankin, Attorney General v. Helena
light and Railway Company, 1924 Public Utilities Reports,
Series B, 13.]

But the obstacles in the way of the commission soon
became obvious. Adequate material support and necessary powers and guidelines never were provided by the
Montana legislature.
In 1967 the authorized expenditure level of the Montana
commission was the lowest of the public service commissions in eleven western states; only five states (Alaska,
Delaware, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont)
had budget levels below Montana. [This and following
comparative data are derived from United States Senate
Committee on Governmental Operations, "State Utility
Commissions," (Washington, 1967).] In the same year
only .five states (Alaska, Delaware, Rhode Island, Utah,
and Vermont) had a smaller utility commission staff than
Montana's fifteen persons, and only the Utah commission
had fewer staff positions than Montana among the eleven
western states. These eleven western states, listed in
descending order of commission staff size, were California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and Utah. Salaries
of full-time state regulatory commissioners ranged from
$10,000 to $29,160 throughout the United States in 1967.
New York paid the highest amount, while Montana along
with Nebraska, North Dakota, Rhode Island and Utah paid
the lowest salary.
The three Montana commissioners along with their
single rate analyst have the task continuously to audit
the books of each utility company under their jurisdiction; the power to initiate rate investigations; and the
duty to prescribe fair rates of return for the utility companies. The regulatory burden on the Public Service
Commission can be appreciated by comparing the size of
its 1970-1971 appropriation to the number and worth of
the utilities it was responsible for regulating. The three
commissioners with their 20-man staff and a budget of
$237,916 had the job of regulating over 600 transportation
carriers and about 200 public utilities. The total plant
valuation of these utilities regulated in 1970-1971 was
set by the commission at $689,073,000 and the total gross
revenue of these companies was put at $169,880,000.

Although rate determination is the most publicized
task of the Public Service Commission, it is only part of
the commission's overall job of supervision. The commission also is to determine if the companies have sufficient
facilities to promote the safety, convenience, and interests of the rate payers, the general public, and the utility's
employees. The commission is authorized to establish and
supervise a uniform system of accounts for the reporting
requirements of the utilities; it must approve their issuance of securities and bonds; the commission can initiate
rate investigations, authorize the abandonment of services, and watch for discrimination in services. Despite
this scope of responsibility the Montana Public Service
Commission does not possess many powers that other
state commissions exercise, especially those powers that
closely regulate the internal business operation of the
utility. For example, 18 state utility commissions regulate exports of electricity; 16 authorize hydroelectric
development; 37 prohibit a utility from acquiring another
type of utility; 47 regulate the sale, merger and purchase
of facilities; 22 regulate declaration of dividends; 35 can
regulate the reorganization of a utility; 20 require advance
submission of a utility's budget; and 15 require competitive bidding on property additions. The Montana Public
Service Commission possesses none of these powers.
Despite the volume of work the Public Service Commission handles and the potential impact of its decisions
on the average citizen of the state, the agency possesses
a low level of public visibility. A 1972 surv~y conducted
by the writer found that of 234 pehons contacted in Great
Falls, Missoula and Helena, 87 percent were unable to
name any incumbent member of the Montana Public
Service Commission. The persons contacted were almost
equally ignorant of the duties of the commission. Seventyfive percent of those contacted could not state a commission function, other than to rephrase the question in terms
of the commission "protecting the public" or "serving
the public." It thus appears that vigorous utility regulation should not look to public backing for the source of
its strength.
It is clear that the Montana Public Service Commission
occupies a difficult political position. The job laid out for
it by statute is imposing. With its limited resources and a
ridiculously small public utilities department, the commission presents · a David and Goliath image as it sets out to
regulate a major part of the state's corporate wealth and
managerial talent. Yet under the present system of selecting members of the commission, an electorate that is not
alert and knowledgeable concerning matters of utility
regulation picks commissioners to make decisions that
greatly affect the economic life of the state. Because of
the great responsibility and the intense policy conflict at
the heart of public utility regulation, the commissioner
selection process should be able to recruit persons with
relevant training, abilities and interests. A scrutiny of
the background and qualifications of Public Service Commiss10ners in Montana reveals another source of
commission weakness.
The original design for utility regulation anticipated
that commissioners would have either a pertinent professional background or the demonstrated capacity and

determination to acquire the necessary expertise. For
example, a background in law, accounting, engineering,
economics, or marketing is consistent with the demands
of the job. In addition to such professional requirements,
and probably mote important, the commissioner should
be keenly aware of the conflicting claims to his allegiance
and able clearly to determine his role amid these tensions.
His mark of excellence is his ability to demonstrate that
his judgment is reasoned and independent. Montana Public Service Commissioners, with very few exceptions,
have come to the position without impressive credentials.
The modest salary level of the office, the position's low
public visibility, failure of the political parties to interest
persons in the office, and the solicitous concern of the
regulated utilities in the commission all may have affected
the qualifications of the commission's membership throughout the years.
Since 1913 when the Board of Railroad Commissioners
began regulating public utilities in Montana, there have
been twenty-two commissioners. Unusual career patterns
have developed on the commission primarily because it
comprises three six-year staggered terms. The commission has been a career merry-go-round for six commissioners who, unseated in one election, regained a position
in a few years. Lengthy but interrupted careers have been
strung together by some men. Others have served on the
commission for long consecutive periods. Seven commissioners (Boyle, Dennis, Young, Casey, Middleton, Smith,
and Boedecker) have accounted for 126 of 180 service
years on the commission since 1913.
But longevity of commissioners in service does not in
itself guarantee the expert, professional, and independent
regulation that the Montana Legislative Assembly and
the state courts long ago concluded they could not provide.
Political parties and the popular election process were
relied upon to insure that men who spent many years on
the Public Service Commission were competent in their
office. Yet most commiss\oners appear to have emerged
from backgrounds completely extraneous to utility regulation; a few men came from jobs in industries subject to
regulation by the commission. Thus at least six men had
prior work experience with railroads, and one had owned
and operated an intrastate bus line. The pre-commission
positions in these instances were not of sufficient managerial responsibility to serve as professional training
grounds for the commission, and thus they would hardly
provide sound basis for a conflict of interest charge.
Montana has witnessed none of the free flow of highlevel talent between commissions and regulated industries
often seen at the federal level. Of the remaining commissioners, two had a background in farming and ranching, and three had been active in real estate. The only
other occupation appearing with some frequency in the
commissioners' background is insurance, which was the
pre-commission business of four men. The work backgrounds of the remaining commissioners included: salesman, newspaper editor, student, radio station operator,
laborer, and personal aide to the governor. Nothing in
this litany of pre-commission experiences suggests that
the commissioners were well-versed in the problems,

tools, and intricacies of utility regulation by way of prior
jobs.
Montana commissioners have not notably been prepared for their duties by their education. Education
would seem to have a role to play in the preparation of
a commissioner, either in lieu of suitable pre-commission
work experience or complementary to such experience
or interests. In the United States, law has represented
the primary educational background of regulatory commissioners. It is clear, however, that professional training in accounting, economics, engineering or marketing
would all be relevant to the job of commissioner. The educational background of nine of the twenty-two commissioners could not be determined, but career patterns indicate that they had not had formal academic preparation in
fields normally thought to be related to public utility
regulation. Three of these nine men had worked for railroads, one as a passenger conductor, one as a passenger
agent, and the other as a fireman; one man had been a
farmer, one a realtor, one a radio station operator, and
the remaining three men spent most of their pre-commission work life in elective county positions and as lowlevel state employees. One commissioner completed eight
years of school and six commissioners terminated their
formal education after high school. Six commissioners
attended college. While it may be presumptuous to specify
a proper educational background for the job of utility
regulation, only Jerry O'Connell, through his legal education, seems to have had some positive preparation that in
context could be called professional education.
Name recognition has played an important role in
electing Public Service Commissioners in Montana.
Some commissioners established their names politically
before they were on the commission by holding or running
for lower state offices or county positions. Other commissioners, as has been observed, have served on the commission for many years, and the longest of these careers were
not made up of consecutive terms. Other men, such as
Boedecker and Holmes, traded on the political value of
their fathers' names and political careers. The frequency
and persistency of familiar names on the ballot gave the
voter an easy solution in voting for an obscure office.
Through the years such commissioners came to possess
a most proprietary relationship to their office.
Weakness of the Public Service Commission can be
seen in its performance as well as in its resources and
membership. The commission's interpretation of its
statutory responsibility to protect the public interest
can be inferred from an analysis of its decisions over the
years. Between 1915 and 1972 the Montana Public Service Commission decided 264 utility cases for which
written formal opinions and orders were reported. Study
of these cases suggests that the Montana Public Service
Commission demonstrated an overall preference for
utility interests in general compared to consumer interests
between 1915 and 1972. There were twenty-one separate
compositions of commission membership during these
57 years. Ten three-member clusters sat during the first
twenty-eight years of the commission, and eleven comprised the second period of the agency. Bernstein's

theory of comrmss10n life cycles with declining regulatory vigor appears to characterize the Montana experience. The ten commissions between 1915 and 1942
decided 54 percent of their cases for the utilities, while
the commissions after 1942 decided 91 percent of their
cases in favor of the companies.

The Montana Political System:
Graveyard of Regulatory Reform
The Montana Public Service Commission decides
matters of utility regulation and sets forth regulatory
orders. These decisions are not simply the product of
three commissioners and their staff. No single factor can
sufficiently account for the nature of utility regulation
in Montana. Persistent willingness in Montana to attribute
regulatory decisions favoring large utilities to bribes and
p~yo~fs is legendary but grossly superficial and probably
rmsdirected. The thrust, content, and limitations of rate
decisions have more probably been determined by other
elements of the Montana political system. Political parties
have traditionally commented on utility regulation, to
influence the policy agenda for the legislature. The
commission is a creature of the legislature; its structure
and powers are products of legislative action or non-action.
And the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention had an
unique opportunity to rewrite completely the ground
rules of utility regulation.
Major political parties in Montana, like those elsewhere in the United States, have had two important
functions. They have attempted to bring diverse groups
together in support of their candidates, and they have
advocated certain policies and philosophies of government. The platforms of the Montana Democratic and
Republican parties reveal vivid contrasts in formal positions on utility regulation; these positions suggest the
respective orientations of their leadership structures.
These contrasts have been especially significant since
the mid l 950's when the pressure of ·monetary inflation
heated up Montana regulatory politics. Populist strains
in the state Democratic Party have given the state a
base for reform sentiments. From 1956 through 1970,
the Democrats repeatedly called for major reforms in
the regulation of privately owned utilities. The Democratic platform of 1956 was typical of that party's views
on regulation during those years:
We urge that the Legislature provide the Public Service
Commission with . . . independent, competent and qualified
rate experts and engineers .. . to make proper recommendation
to the Commission in all future rate cases, and that it require
of_all rate applicants specific and complete evidence of its operatmg costs, taxes, and cost of capital invested . .. .
We urge the creation of the office of Public Defender to
assure the people that their interests are protected in this
state, where utility interests are so powerful.
The staggered 6-year term of Public Service Commissioners
tends to make this board insensitive to public opinion and
public interest. We urge the Legislature to make a study of the
situation with a view of making the board more responsive to
the public interest.
We urge the Legislature [to] review and study the method

by which the rate base of public utilities is determined, and
protect the public against excessive rates.
We view with pride the accomplishments resulting from the
REA partnership between farmer cooperatives, public power
districts and the Federal Government. .. .

Meanwhile Republican platforms were silent concerning
utility regulation or called for an end to the special income
tax advantages that cooperatives enjoyed. The 1962 Republican platform denounced claims of the Bureau of Reclamation to parts of the Missouri River as attempts to "destroy individual enterprise and drastically limit area development," opposed the federal government's Knowles Dam
on the ground it would destroy "the tax base of several
counties," and urged that cooperatives be made to "assume
their fair share of the cost of government." Given the
predictably partisan overtones of these platforms, they
did inject goals for regulatory reform into the state's
public arena.
All paths to change of the Montana regulatory situation
lead to the Montana Legislative Assembly. The platforms
of the Democratic Party have consistently recognized
this fact, but in the end the campaign recommendations
have proved to be futile. A Missoulian editorial (December 4, 1967) said: "If Montanans wish to remove this
debate forever, . . . the public, via the legislature, has
full power to straighten things out." The Montana Supreme Court has repeatedly identified the state legislature as the real battleground for regulatory reform. In
1921 the court said:
It is well-settled law that rate-making is purely a legislative

act... . The legislature itself has the undoubted authority to
regulate public utilities, and by means of a duly constituted
commission it operates through its administrative medium.
[Billings Utility Company v. Public Service Commission, 62
Mont. 21 , 33 (1921)]

In 1970 the court said:
I~

is a basic rule of law that the Commission, as an administrative agency, has only those powers specifically conferred upon
it by the legislature and in determining those statutory powers,
this Court must give effect to every word, phrase, clause, or
sentence therein . .. . [City of Polson v. Public Service Commission of Montana, 155 Mont. 464, 469 (1970)]

To understand why the Public Service Commission has
behaved as it has, and to understand the fundamental
constraints on that body, it is necessary to examine the
fate of regulatory reform proposals in the legislature.
The Public Service Commission was established in
1913 as an ex officio arm of the Montana Board of Railroad Commissioners. From that time through the 1971
Legislative Assembly, 90 reform measures of various
sorts were introduced and only ten of these bills ultimately became · 1aw. Democrats sponsored 38 percent of
the total and thus had no corner on claims to regulatory
reform. Democratic sponsorship was scattered throughout
t~e thirty sessions, while 17 of 26 Republican-sponsored
bills appeared between 1913 and 1933. In recent sessions
reformers in both parties have joined forces to sponsor
measures for change. Eleven of nineteen jointly sponsored
bills were introduced from 1967 to 1971 . While the Democratic Party has been solely responsible for less than 50
percent of the regulatory reform bills, its advocacy has

been more consistent and insistent, and in recent years it
has noticeably been the more outspoken voice of reform.
Although the measures introduced in the Montana
legislature to change the operating status of utilities
have been far-ranging, some specific reforms have been
pushed repeatedly over many years. For example, the
legislature was asked on seven occasions to investigate
operations of the Public Service Commission. There were
seven legislative proposals to change the name of the
Montana Board of Railroad Commissioners, usually to
something like the "Montana Public Service Commission,"
and eleven attempts to abolish the commission. Recurrence of such proposals emphasizes the defeat or quiet
death of most of these bills. Of the ten bills enacted after
the 1913 statute established the commission, four were
passed in the l 97 l legislature and six of the ten since
1961, indicating that strength of reform views in the state
legislature is recent. Three of ten bills that became law
were special appropriation measures; two authorized the
Legislative Council to study the Public Service Commission; an administrative procedure act and an executive
reorganization bill that made the "Public Service Commission" the head of a Department of Public Service
Regulation also were enacted. The only bona fide piece
of reform legislation enacted before 1961 was a 1937 bill
that authorized the Public Service Commission to earmark and impound the difference between old and new
rates pending final determination in a rate case. In 1961,
after two failures in past years, the commission was
given the power to regulate and supervise the issuance
of securities by Montana public utilities. In 1971, a
territorial integrity bill was passed that would protect
one electric company's service area from invasion by
another.
The most significant evidence of the legislative relationship to the Public Service Commission is found in
the 79 bills that were killed. As the parent of the regulatory body, the legislature repeatedly stifled the commission's growth and ability to innovate. It engulfed and
buried the regulatory reform attempts of a singular crusading Public Service Commission in 1935, of scattered progressive Democrats over the years, and of a recent coalition
of reform-minded Democrats and Republicans. The fate
of these bills reflects the fact that operations of the Public
Service Commission long have been an intense political
issue, yet no strategy and organization have developed an
adequate reform vehicle. A commission that "might have
been" always existed in the minds of the reformyrs, but
counter-forces in the legislature always prevented its
realization.
Some of the reform bills were radical and all demonstrated a common assumption of the weakness of the
commission. Bills to give the commission a name that
more clearly identified for the public and voters its
public utility regulation task often gave way to bills to
abolish the commission outright, or to dismantle and
replace it with something different. On four occasions it
was proposed that the duties of the commission be transferred to the Board of Equalization; in various sessions
it was suggested that cities and towns should regulate
utilities, or that a new commission of other state officials

such as the auditor, agriculture commissioner, and state
engineer, or the governor, secretary of state and auditor,
should have these regulatory duties.
Most bills, however, proposed to attack major ills of
the commission rather than destroy it. The selection
process for commissioners and staff were often addressed.
Three bills would have had the Governor appoint the
commissioners, and one of these proposals called for a
single appointed public utility commissioner. Three bills
aimed to correct weaknesses in the staff of the commission. The most radical staffing proposal was a 1971 bill
to create a utility consumer's counsel in the Attorney
General's office to represent consumers in rate cases.
This bill amounted to assertion by its sponsors that the
Public Service Commission was unable properly to carry
out its dual role to protect the consuming public while
serving as an impartial quasi-judical agency. Seven
bills recognized that there was an information problem
for the commission in its attempts to reach decisions
from limited and unilaterally prepared data; these proposals sought to strengthen the reporting requirements
of the public utilities to the Public Service Commission.
A bill concerning evidence in commission proceedings
would have placed the burden of proof in rate cases on
the utility petitioning for an increase. Another bill would
have required the public utility to pay the cost of a mandated valuation investigation by the commission, and
seven bills went still further, caUing for changes in the
valuation criteria for rate-making that would better
protect the consumer.
The largest category of reform bills, those to increase
the regulatory power of the commission, exhibited a
certain optimism about the basic regulatory approach.
Fifteen of these 22 bills were prepared in 1935 at the
request of Commissioners Jerry J. O'Connell and Thomas
Carey who found sympathetic sponsors in the legislature.
This aggressive legislative advocacy by commissioners
was unique in the history of the relationship between the
commission and the legislature. The Western Progressive
reported on February 15, 1935, that the Public Service
Commission "presented to the legislature its legislative
program designed to end domination of political activities in this state by the Montana Power Company and
affiliated corporations." The 1935 bills empowered the
Public Service Commission to investigate all contracts of
public utilities with other parties, to supervise the budget
process of public utilities, to reduce rates of any company
making an excessive profit on its capital investment, and
to review and revise downward prior writeups in value
of utility property.
Some reformers hoped that the Montana Constitutional
Convention of 1972 could circumvent persistent unwillingness of the legislature to alter the status quo in utility
regulation. George Heliker, Missoula delegate and professor of economics at the University of Montana, sponsored a proposal to: - establish a single commissioner
appointed by the governor; fix the commissioner's role
as defender of consumer interests; free the commissioner
from judicial control and the fair value standard; and
authorize the legislature to set up public power distribution agencies free from the commissioner's control.

Heliker believed that future legislative reform attempts
would repeat the past, so that constitutional reform was
in order.
Privately owned utilities, both large and small, strongly
opposed Heliker's proposal. Their testimony made it
clear that they preferred the existing regulatory situation.
Any change in the state's method of regulating utilities
would result in new relationships, new procedures, and
possibly new policies. Heliker's plan embodied the hope
that the desired regulatory realignment would achieve
tougher regulation. The strategy of the reform advocates
was opposed by the utilities and rejected by a majority
of the Public Health, Welfare, Labor, and Industry Committee. The committee majority said that the matter
should be left to the legislature, that it was too experimental to be taken seriously, and that they had received
little evidence that the present regulatory system was not
satisfactory. The delegates rejected use of the new state
constitution to achieve what their legislative cousins had
failed to accomplish in utility regulation. Failing to view
utility regulation as a fundamental and enduring governmental concern, the Constitutional Convention left reform
to another day.
So it has happened that Montana regulatory policies
have been the products of a web of relationships within
the state's political system. Reform policies have not
lacked advocates. Such measures have repeatedly been
articulated in inconsequential party platforms, in minority reports of legislative committees, and in a minority
proposal of the Constitutional Convention. Legislative
and convention majorities rejected reform, and fundamental weaknesses of the Public Service Commission
have been left untouched. There has been no effective
vehicle for regulatory reform in Montana politics.

Conclusion
A Call for Uncommon Leadership
The Montana Public Service Commission was established to regulate the public utility industry in the public
interest. Fair and open procedures for utility regulation
should guarantee that adequate service is available to all
consumers without discrimination at the lowest reasonable rates. It is expected that rates take into account the
reasonable needs of both the consuming public and the
utilities. Yet more often than not the commission has
appeared to place the needs of the utility companies
before the needs of utility consumers. As we have seen,
this policy orientation is the product of a complex set of
factors whose net result has been to keep the commission
weak and passive as a public agency.
The commission has been repeatedly criticized for failing to defend the public interest. Farm groups, cooperatives and the ideological left, traditionally harbored in
the Montana Democratic Party, have taken the position
that the public sector should allocate the state's material
resources; they would accomplish through government
what they have been unable to achieve privately. These
reformers believe that change in commission procedures
will place them in a better position to influence policies

because the regulatory system at present is relatively
closed to their influence.
A second critical perspective is more basic, recognizing that utility regulation must accomplish a compromise
between public ownership and unchecked private monopoly. The political environment of utility regulation in
Montana has raised the possibility that government regulation of utilities could ruin a privately owned business.
The statutory definition of regulation has fostered both
politicization and an undiluted private business, "freeenterprise" posture in the state's privately owned utility
industry. The Montana legislature has declared certain
kinds of utilities to be "public," but the intent of the word
and the means to secure this intent through the operation
of the commission have never been established. This
failure to define the conditions for making utilities truly
"public" has allowed them to remain essentially "private"
and unregulated. In response to these ambiguities the
utility industry has become what no vehicle of reform in
Montana has ever been: organized, cohesive, disciplined
and policy-minded. The commission has been "privatized" because channels to it have been kept narrow and
exclusive. Thus the commission accepts the utilities'
definition of the public interest, that is, what they think to
be best for Montana concerning utilities. The commissioners hear systematic presentation of the public interest
only as the utilities see it because no other body, public
or private, possesses comparable information, resources
and organization. In consequence regulatory politics in
Montana reacts against established policies and attempts
to alter both the power alignment in the state and the
dominant political philosophy that maintains these pol1c1es.
Much discussion of utility regulation in Montana has
expressed clashes between competing public and private
utility interests and their allies. The primary question how
to make the utility industry serve the public has not received adequate discussion. Because publicly owned
utilities and cooperatives possess political and economic
legitimacy as do privately-owned utilities, the "public
interest" must be defined through the political process in
which different interests can be expressed at different
times. The "public" cannot be permanently identified
with any fixed or given set of absolute values or altruistic
principles. Nor can the public interest be identified only
by the size of utility bills or the rate of return on the
utility's investment. By over-simplifying the idea of the
public interest, opponents of the privately- owned utilities
and of the existing regulatory situation have made utility
regulation common currency of Montana politics. Such
narrow delineation of a valid political issue-the adequacy
of utility regulation-has mortgaged the state's political
system to suspicion and cynicism and to inordinate infiltration of the public processes by a regulated private
business.
The Montana regulatory situation will always be a
product of relationships as complex as those comprising
the status quo. A new balance of these tensions in the
Montana political system must be realized before a different definition of the public interest can begin to evolve.
No simple yet effective program for change seems possible, but necessary conditions for a strong and indepen-

dent comm1ss10n can be identified. The public interest in
the area of utility regulation must be defined in procedural terms. The system of utility regulation in Montana
must be put on a fair and balanced basis to secure the
political health of the state. A reform of the regulatory
system must rest upon a generally held belief that the rate
structure, at whatever level it is set, is the product of
exhaustive investigation reflecting the judgment of respected and self-respecting professionals.
Initially it is the unfulfilled duty of the Montana Legislature clearly to define the "public" character of the
privately owned utilities. This will amount to an authoritative classification of the permitted and prohibited, the
regulated and unregulated activities of privately owned
utilities. These statements of legislative policy will increase the burden of the commission but give it heightened prestige. Recognition of the importance of the commission's charge should be accompanied by provision of
adequate resources and sufficient staff expertise. In the
absence of such legislative action to create commission
independence that has been markedly absent in Montana,
regulatory politics will remain the province of half truths
and worn-out debate.

Commensurate with its increased duties the commission should become an expert administrative agency akin
to an administrative court. The Governor should appoint
highly-paid persons of unquestionable professional
stature to serve as commissioners. It is also indispensable
that the separate office of consumer counsel be carefully
staffed and adequately funded to handle the duties of
consumer advocacy, because the commission has not
been able to carry out effectively both its deciding and its
investigative duties. Professional commissioners would
accompany their decisions with reasoned opinions telling
why a case was so decided. Principles of rate-making
would be structured into the clash of the contending parties, and the decision-making process would occur in a
climate of seeking and experimenting among openly
articulated public values.
It is difficult to see how measures less than these will
dispel the heavy cynicism that surrounds Montana politics. A supportive change in public attitudes probably will
support courageous though uncharacteristic legislative
initiatives. Such steps will open up the regulatory system
and they may diminish the string of compromises that
has been its history.
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